Fishrot: How 'democratic regimentation' and clientelism facilitated the worst looting in Namibian history
TJEKUPE MAXIMALLIANT KATJIMUNE
The Fishrot saga shook the entire nation to the core. The pure magnitude of the looting, and the manner in which it was executed, was something out of a Hollywood blockbuster movie. Of course, Namibia has witnessed some significant corruption scandals in the past, one of those being the Avid corruption case. Yet nothing comes close to Fishrot.
Fishrot is a representation of a number of phenomena coming together. Firstly, it demonstrates why the nature of the one-party state that developed post-colonialism is so dangerous in its current form. Secondly, it highlights the manner in which those who are affiliated to this homogeneous political power can abuse it and thirdly, it displays the fact that the private sector and private individuals who conduct business with the state can themselves be willing participants and facilitators of corruption in the post-colonial African state.
In essence, Fishrot was facilitated through a long line of patron-client relations, where those who have historical links and support with the governing Swapo Party took advantage of their positions within this network to loot state resources. However, we firstly have to identify what exactly constitutes the notion of clientelism within the African context, and the crucial role it plays in facilitating corrupt networks in the state.
One has to point out that although most countries on the African continents hold regular elections towards the attaining democratisation, these elections are mostly inconsequential because a significant number of countries on the African context are in fact one-party states, and resemble nations that are regime run in their nature. This is why it becomes important to use the word 'democratic regimentation' when analysing clientelism within nations such as Namibia.
In its most simplistic definition, clientelism is defined as the exercise of patronage in exchange for support, in this case political support. In his journal titled 'Clientelism, Corruption and Catastrophe', Morris Szeftel correctly contends that clientelism is a direct consequence of colonialism. His contention is correct in a number of respects.
When colonialism ended, the significant majority of African states adopted the western tenets of democracy, rule of law and liberalism. However, unlike the European polity, these new African democratic dispensations are largely ruled and defined as one party states, whereby one party, often being the one that fought the coloniser, has excessive power and control over the state machinery and resources of that particular country.
Secondly, most post-colonial constitutions in these new African democratic dispensations are drafted in such a manner that it gives the executive branch of government, the president and cabinet, much more power than the legislature, parliament. What this means is that more often than not, government in post-colonial Africa can draft and implement policies often with ill-intentions meant to loot and to benefit themselves. This was clearly demonstrated when one of the orchestrators of Fishrot, almost singlehandedly, amended the Marine Resources Act to pave the way for the looting.
This homogenous executive power hence enables the post-colonial states to establish extensive lines of patron-client relations. These relations are aimed at sustaining the one-party state.
These patron-client lines are established with all facets of society ranging from civil servants, traditional and religious leaders, and even the private sector.
What is also very imperative to point out is that the unequal nature of the post-colonial state greatly contributes to the establishment of these patron-client lines. With a massively skewed distribution of wealth between the previously advantaged and the previously disadvantaged, most poor people fall beyond the poverty line and greatly rely on the state for assistance.
This overreliance on the state for welfare creates clientelism in its most pure and simplest form and gives those who have access to the resources of the country much more power to loot those resources without much protest or interference from the poor and disenfranchised.
However, there is hope that these patron-client lines are being cut slowly but surely, and the masses of Africans in general and Namibians in particular are standing up to corruption and the one-party state.
* Tjekupe Maximalliant Katjimune is the national spokesperson of the PDMYL and a scholar of political science and sociology from the University of Namibia.
The Fishrot saga shook the entire nation to the core. The pure magnitude of the looting, and the manner in which it was executed, was something out of a Hollywood blockbuster movie. Of course, Namibia has witnessed some significant corruption scandals in the past, one of those being the Avid corruption case. Yet nothing comes close to Fishrot.
Fishrot is a representation of a number of phenomena coming together. Firstly, it demonstrates why the nature of the one-party state that developed post-colonialism is so dangerous in its current form. Secondly, it highlights the manner in which those who are affiliated to this homogeneous political power can abuse it and thirdly, it displays the fact that the private sector and private individuals who conduct business with the state can themselves be willing participants and facilitators of corruption in the post-colonial African state.
In essence, Fishrot was facilitated through a long line of patron-client relations, where those who have historical links and support with the governing Swapo Party took advantage of their positions within this network to loot state resources. However, we firstly have to identify what exactly constitutes the notion of clientelism within the African context, and the crucial role it plays in facilitating corrupt networks in the state.
One has to point out that although most countries on the African continents hold regular elections towards the attaining democratisation, these elections are mostly inconsequential because a significant number of countries on the African context are in fact one-party states, and resemble nations that are regime run in their nature. This is why it becomes important to use the word 'democratic regimentation' when analysing clientelism within nations such as Namibia.
In its most simplistic definition, clientelism is defined as the exercise of patronage in exchange for support, in this case political support. In his journal titled 'Clientelism, Corruption and Catastrophe', Morris Szeftel correctly contends that clientelism is a direct consequence of colonialism. His contention is correct in a number of respects.
When colonialism ended, the significant majority of African states adopted the western tenets of democracy, rule of law and liberalism. However, unlike the European polity, these new African democratic dispensations are largely ruled and defined as one party states, whereby one party, often being the one that fought the coloniser, has excessive power and control over the state machinery and resources of that particular country.
Secondly, most post-colonial constitutions in these new African democratic dispensations are drafted in such a manner that it gives the executive branch of government, the president and cabinet, much more power than the legislature, parliament. What this means is that more often than not, government in post-colonial Africa can draft and implement policies often with ill-intentions meant to loot and to benefit themselves. This was clearly demonstrated when one of the orchestrators of Fishrot, almost singlehandedly, amended the Marine Resources Act to pave the way for the looting.
This homogenous executive power hence enables the post-colonial states to establish extensive lines of patron-client relations. These relations are aimed at sustaining the one-party state.
These patron-client lines are established with all facets of society ranging from civil servants, traditional and religious leaders, and even the private sector.
What is also very imperative to point out is that the unequal nature of the post-colonial state greatly contributes to the establishment of these patron-client lines. With a massively skewed distribution of wealth between the previously advantaged and the previously disadvantaged, most poor people fall beyond the poverty line and greatly rely on the state for assistance.
This overreliance on the state for welfare creates clientelism in its most pure and simplest form and gives those who have access to the resources of the country much more power to loot those resources without much protest or interference from the poor and disenfranchised.
However, there is hope that these patron-client lines are being cut slowly but surely, and the masses of Africans in general and Namibians in particular are standing up to corruption and the one-party state.
* Tjekupe Maximalliant Katjimune is the national spokesperson of the PDMYL and a scholar of political science and sociology from the University of Namibia.
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