Why French soldiers are leaving Africa
Senegal and Chad are in turn asking French soldiers to leave their territory, as they seek other forms of military cooperation with Paris.
“A slap in the face for Paris”; “France no longer understands Africa”; “Chad and Senegal refuse to accept Françafrique”. The international press is having a field day with Chad’s firm request to break off its defence cooperation agreements with France. The announcement was made on 28 November 2024 in a press release from the Chadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a few hours after the departure of French minister Jean-Noël Barrot. ‘France must now consider that Chad has grown up and matured, and that Chad is a sovereign state that is very jealous of its sovereignty’, explained his Chadian counterpart, Abderaman Koulamallah. He told Le Monde that the decision had been ‘ carefully considered ’. For his part, the Head of State, Mahamat Déby Itno, was keen to make it clear that the announced break ‘ only concerns the military cooperation agreement in its current configuration ’.
Coincidentally, on the same day, Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye told the French media that he would like to see French soldiers leave Senegal. The President made it clear that no timetable for their withdrawal had yet been set. For Senegal, however, there is no question of denouncing military cooperation agreements.
Senegal’s announcement came as no surprise, as the departure of French troops was a commitment made by the Pastef presidential party, which has just won the legislative elections. Chad’s sudden announcement came as more of a surprise, as up until then Chad had seemed to value its military cooperation with France, considered to be a reliable ally against jihadism in the Sahel. It seems a little early to say whether this decision signals a rapprochement with the Sahelian countries that have already severed their military ties with France.
An altered French strategy
‘This is not the first time that the French military presence has been called into question in this country,’ comments Francis Laloupo on the IRIS (Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques) website. The researcher points above all to reasons stemming from Chadian domestic politics: ‘ The new executive has to come to terms with the different political currents and opinions in order to establish a certain form of legitimacy. The issue is to ensure the continuity of a system, while at the same time producing signs of a break with the past, demonstrating a new form of governance ‘.
As a result, Chad’s gesture towards France is based on two arguments: ‘On the one hand, a re-reading of the basis and relevance of military agreements steeped in colonial history, and on the other, the country’s stated desire to diversify its partnerships ’. Indeed, since 2022, Chad has been looking for new ‘ strategic ’ partners, such as Russia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Hungary. Just as other countries in the Sahel and West Africa are doing.
In addition to this political context, the IRIS researcher notes the ‘ alteration ’ of France’s strategy of military influence in the Sahel in recent years, the pressure of public opinion opposed to the maintenance of French military bases perceived as a neo-colonial symbol, and the exacerbation of rivalries between major powers. Not to mention Russia’s offensive on the continent.
Be that as it may, ‘ while Chad can count on the expertise of its defence forces to deal with security threats, the authorities are well aware that the fight against non-state armed groups cannot be waged in isolation ’, continues Francis Laloupo. He considers that Chad’s decision will not significantly alter the management of the security situation in the country and its neighbours.
The fact remains that France will have to review the terms of its military cooperation, which will probably be based more on technical and logistical support, or on one-off missions.
‘Even if the French leaders are still denying it, the political breakdown following Operation Barkhane will probably put an end to the long series of French military interventions in French-speaking Africa ’, commented Thierry Vircoulon, of the IFRI (French Institute of International Relations), a few days before the Chadian and Senegalese announcements.
‘We can no longer imagine a French government and an African government agreeing on a new military adventure ’, apart from occasional evacuation missions.
Cooperation that has become pointless as it stands
For African public opinion, Franco-African military operations embody the heritage of the French military ‘ pré carré ’ and, for French strategists, are nothing more than useless holdings. So ‘what’ s the point of having a pre-positioned military force ’, asks the IFRI researcher. He considers that France is now turning more towards the Indo-Pacific and Eastern Europe.
‘At best, the bases could become useful again for training the host country’s army, or even countries in the region, as President Emmanuel Macron mentioned in his speech on 27 February 2023 ’, says the analyst, who notes that “ this reuse of bases is already under way ”. What’s more, there is hardly any strategic plan for Africa, or any African policy on the part of France. So what is the point of maintaining military cooperation?
Referring to the argument that maintaining French military cooperation would prevent the arrival of geopolitical competitors, the researcher points out that this is contradicted by the evolution of the security landscape in Africa over the last twenty years. France’s competitors and enemies have taken root while Paris has stepped up its operations and training. ‘ More or less French military cooperation is not going to change the strategy of Turkey, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Russia or China in Africa, nor that of African governments, which got out of the head-to-head with Paris a long time ago and continue to diversify their security partnerships. ’
What’s more, the revival of military cooperation carries a high geopolitical risk coefficient, which has already been proven in the Sahel. The researcher adds: ‘ In the climate of a new Cold War that is not sparing Africa, today’s partners can become tomorrow’s enemies. This is the cruel lesson that the leaders of the juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have taught Paris ‘. - New African
“A slap in the face for Paris”; “France no longer understands Africa”; “Chad and Senegal refuse to accept Françafrique”. The international press is having a field day with Chad’s firm request to break off its defence cooperation agreements with France. The announcement was made on 28 November 2024 in a press release from the Chadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a few hours after the departure of French minister Jean-Noël Barrot. ‘France must now consider that Chad has grown up and matured, and that Chad is a sovereign state that is very jealous of its sovereignty’, explained his Chadian counterpart, Abderaman Koulamallah. He told Le Monde that the decision had been ‘ carefully considered ’. For his part, the Head of State, Mahamat Déby Itno, was keen to make it clear that the announced break ‘ only concerns the military cooperation agreement in its current configuration ’.
Coincidentally, on the same day, Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye told the French media that he would like to see French soldiers leave Senegal. The President made it clear that no timetable for their withdrawal had yet been set. For Senegal, however, there is no question of denouncing military cooperation agreements.
Senegal’s announcement came as no surprise, as the departure of French troops was a commitment made by the Pastef presidential party, which has just won the legislative elections. Chad’s sudden announcement came as more of a surprise, as up until then Chad had seemed to value its military cooperation with France, considered to be a reliable ally against jihadism in the Sahel. It seems a little early to say whether this decision signals a rapprochement with the Sahelian countries that have already severed their military ties with France.
An altered French strategy
‘This is not the first time that the French military presence has been called into question in this country,’ comments Francis Laloupo on the IRIS (Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques) website. The researcher points above all to reasons stemming from Chadian domestic politics: ‘ The new executive has to come to terms with the different political currents and opinions in order to establish a certain form of legitimacy. The issue is to ensure the continuity of a system, while at the same time producing signs of a break with the past, demonstrating a new form of governance ‘.
As a result, Chad’s gesture towards France is based on two arguments: ‘On the one hand, a re-reading of the basis and relevance of military agreements steeped in colonial history, and on the other, the country’s stated desire to diversify its partnerships ’. Indeed, since 2022, Chad has been looking for new ‘ strategic ’ partners, such as Russia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Hungary. Just as other countries in the Sahel and West Africa are doing.
In addition to this political context, the IRIS researcher notes the ‘ alteration ’ of France’s strategy of military influence in the Sahel in recent years, the pressure of public opinion opposed to the maintenance of French military bases perceived as a neo-colonial symbol, and the exacerbation of rivalries between major powers. Not to mention Russia’s offensive on the continent.
Be that as it may, ‘ while Chad can count on the expertise of its defence forces to deal with security threats, the authorities are well aware that the fight against non-state armed groups cannot be waged in isolation ’, continues Francis Laloupo. He considers that Chad’s decision will not significantly alter the management of the security situation in the country and its neighbours.
The fact remains that France will have to review the terms of its military cooperation, which will probably be based more on technical and logistical support, or on one-off missions.
‘Even if the French leaders are still denying it, the political breakdown following Operation Barkhane will probably put an end to the long series of French military interventions in French-speaking Africa ’, commented Thierry Vircoulon, of the IFRI (French Institute of International Relations), a few days before the Chadian and Senegalese announcements.
‘We can no longer imagine a French government and an African government agreeing on a new military adventure ’, apart from occasional evacuation missions.
Cooperation that has become pointless as it stands
For African public opinion, Franco-African military operations embody the heritage of the French military ‘ pré carré ’ and, for French strategists, are nothing more than useless holdings. So ‘what’ s the point of having a pre-positioned military force ’, asks the IFRI researcher. He considers that France is now turning more towards the Indo-Pacific and Eastern Europe.
‘At best, the bases could become useful again for training the host country’s army, or even countries in the region, as President Emmanuel Macron mentioned in his speech on 27 February 2023 ’, says the analyst, who notes that “ this reuse of bases is already under way ”. What’s more, there is hardly any strategic plan for Africa, or any African policy on the part of France. So what is the point of maintaining military cooperation?
Referring to the argument that maintaining French military cooperation would prevent the arrival of geopolitical competitors, the researcher points out that this is contradicted by the evolution of the security landscape in Africa over the last twenty years. France’s competitors and enemies have taken root while Paris has stepped up its operations and training. ‘ More or less French military cooperation is not going to change the strategy of Turkey, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Russia or China in Africa, nor that of African governments, which got out of the head-to-head with Paris a long time ago and continue to diversify their security partnerships. ’
What’s more, the revival of military cooperation carries a high geopolitical risk coefficient, which has already been proven in the Sahel. The researcher adds: ‘ In the climate of a new Cold War that is not sparing Africa, today’s partners can become tomorrow’s enemies. This is the cruel lesson that the leaders of the juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have taught Paris ‘. - New African
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